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ABSTRACT
THE EFFECTS OF REWARD AND RISK LEVEL ASSOCIATED WITH SPEEDED
ACTIONS: EVIDENCE FROM BEHAVIOR AND ELECTROENCEPHALOGRAPHY
SEPTEMBER 2018
XINGJIE CHEN, B.S., CENTRAL CHINA NORMAL UNIVERSITY
M.S., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Youngbin Kwak
Choosing a course of action in our daily lives requires an accurate assessment of the
associated risks as well as the potential rewards. The present two studies investigated the
mechanism of how reward and risk level influence the motor decisions of speeded actions
(Chapter 2) and its neural dynamics (Chapter 3) by focusing on the beta band (15-30 Hz)
oscillation patterns reflected in the EEG signals. Participants performed a modified version of the
Go-NoGo task, in which they earned reward points based on the speed and accuracy of response.
On each trial, the reward points at stake (120 vs. 6) and the probability that a Go signal would
follow (Go-probability) were presented prior to a Go/NoGo signal (Trial Information Period).
The behavioral results (from both Chapters 2 and 3) showed that larger amount of rewards can
motivate people to respond faster, and this effect was modulated by the assessed risk, suggesting
that decisions for actions are based on a systematic trade-off between rewards and risks. The
EEG data showed that motor beta oscillations from the two studied brain regions reflected
different levels of motivation towards a motor response across different reward and risk levels.
Specifically, the lower beta power associated with higher reward and lower risk level.
Collectively, the results provide a mechanistic understanding of how motivational cues are
translated into action outcomes via modulating patterns of brain oscillations.
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CHAPTER 1
LITERATURE REVIEW
1.1 Introduction
Imagine yourself facing a yellow light. You can choose to press down on the gas pedal to
make it through or to slow down and come to a stop. Choosing a course of action in a daily life
situation as described requires an accurate assessment of the associated risks as well as the
potential rewards. These assessments would entail weighing the costs and benefits of one action
(e.g. speeding up to make the light) vs. the other (e.g. slowing down to come to a stop). Recent
studies have shown that one relies on a systematic trade-off between the benefits and the costs as
well as risks associated with an action when making these decisions, equivalent to the
predictions of economic choice theory (Burke, Brunger, Kahnt, Park, & Tobler, 2013; KleinFlügge, Kennerley, Friston, & Bestmann, 2016; Skvortsova, Palminteri, & Pessiglione, 2014).
Specifically, these studies demonstrate that individuals put greater motor efforts when the
potential rewards are higher and the associated risks are lower, which parallels the normative
trade-offs between decision variables such as value and risk during economic decision making.
These works are also in line with the important theoretical efforts in the field of visual motor
control aimed at understanding movement planning and control within the framework of
economic decision making (Trommershäuser, Maloney, & Landy, 2008; Wolpert & Landy,
2012). In these theoretical efforts, motor control is viewed as a problem of maximizing the utility
of movement outcomes in the face of sensory, motor and task uncertainty (Wolpert & Landy,
2012), which is equivalent to economic choice scenarios under uncertainty (Platt & Huettel,
2008).
In the present thesis, I investigated the neural bases of decisions for actions. Within this
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effort, I first developed a novel task paradigm to investigate how rewards and risk level influence
motor decisions in speeded actions (Chapter 2). Then I investigated how the human brain
evaluates reward and risk level associated with an action by focusing on the neural oscillation
patterns reflected in the EEG signals (Chapter 3). In particular, I studied whether the betafrequency oscillations involved in motor processing were modulated by the reward and risk level
associated with a speeded action.

1.2 Motor Control and Decision Making
Decision making for actions is most often present in choosing to exert motor efforts
towards a goal. A typical example is shown in animal foraging behavior; the animal puts forth
moving around from location to location to retrieve food rewards. In doing so, they explore their
environment to minimize foraging costs and maximize retrieval of foods (Bautista, Tinbergen, &
Kacelnik, 2001; Kacelnik, 1997; MacArthur & Pianka, 1966).
In laboratory studies, decisions to put forth physical efforts has often been studied in
relation to intrinsic motivation and external incentive rewards (Ballanger et al., 2006; D. D. Chen
& Chen, 2013; Joshua & Lisberger, 2012; Mir et al., 2011; Ramnani & Miall, 2003). These
studies demonstrate that presenting potential reward outcomes can lead to faster responses and
exertion of greater forces during an action required for retrieving the reward. More recent work
has shown that there is a systematic trade-off between physical effort and the associated rewards
in humans. Specifically these studies showed that people decided to put greater physical efforts
only when it would result in larger rewards (Burke et al., 2013; Hartmann, Hager, Tobler, &
Kaiser, 2013; Klein-Flügge et al., 2016; Klein-Flugge, Kennerley, Saraiva, Penny, & Bestmann,
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2015; Treadway et al., 2012; Wardle, Treadway, Mayo, Zald, & de Wit, 2011). This suggests
that similar to the temporal delay to reward arrival, physical efforts can discount the reward
value at stake.
It is important to note that risk, as well as reward, is one of the key variables of decision
making under uncertainty. In general terms, risk is known as a chance of negative outcome
(Mishra, 2014), such as harm, loss, and danger (Bornovalova et al., 2009; Leigh, 1999). Risk is
also an important variable to consider in decisions for course of actions. For example, while one
may choose to drive fast to avoid being late for work, one should also consider that speed driving
increases the risk of traffic accidents. Despite its relevance to real life, not many studies have
focused on how risk plays a role in decisions for actions. In one study, a statistical decision
theory was developed to explain the processes underlying a motor action under risk, using a
simple target-hitting task (Trommershäuser, Gepshtein, Maloney, Landy, & Banks, 2005;
Trommershäuser, Maloney, & Landy, 2003a, 2003b). In this task, participants were asked to
rapidly hit a target area using their fingertips in order to gain a reward and received a penalty if
they hit the non-target areas. Thus the risk related with their action is proportional to their motor
variability. The experimental data and the model suggested that decisions on an action was made
based on one’s estimate of the sensorimotor variability, which allowed controlling for their
motor responses to minimize the risk associated with the movement and maximize the reward
(Trommershäuser et al., 2003a). This study, however, was not designed to look at the
motivational aspect of the risk-taking movements. First of all, the levels of obtainable rewards
did not vary, while the magnitude of expected rewards could motivate people toward a high risk
action (Doya, 2008). Furthermore, the level of risk associated with an action was not explicitly
described such that one can make prior judgment on the course of action. Instead, it was
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implicitly defined as a result of motor variability. Further studies considering both reward and
risk in the same context is required to clarify the processes underlying decision making for an
action.
One goal of the present studies is to develop a motor decision paradigm combining both
reward and risk level and investigate how people evaluate the reward and risk level to make a
motor decision. While “speed” is an important variable determining the characteristics of a
movement, most studies have only focused on physical force in the studies of decision making
for actions (e.g., Kurniawan et al., 2010; Meyniel & Pessiglione, 2014; Skvortsova et al., 2014).
Movement speed is one of the most important factors influencing sensorimotor variability that is
associated with risks during a movement (Trommershäuser et al., 2005; Trommershäuser et al.,
2003b). Importantly, speed is naturally associated with greater risk for failure in any task
performance as demonstrated in speed-accuracy trade-off (Franks, Dornhaus, Fitzsimmons, &
Stevens, 2003; Pachella, 1973; Ratcliff & Tuerlinckx, 2002). Thus movement speed is one
measure to look at the effects of risk in decision making for action.

1.3 Beta Oscillation in Cortico-Basal Ganglia Circuitry – Target neural mechanism
In addition to the behavioral study about the effect of reward on risk level on motor
actions, I would like to further investigated the under neural bases of this process. Until now, the
literature about motor actions focused on the cortico-basal ganglia circuitry of motor initiation
and inhibition, specifically, including direct and indirect pathway as well as the hyper-direct
pathway. The details of the cortico-basal ganglia circuitries were described in the following
sections.
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1.3.1 Direct Pathway and Indirect Pathway
The direct and indirect pathway of movement is a neuronal circuit within the central
nervous system (CNS) through the basal ganglia (Freeze, Kravitz, Hammack, Berke, & Kreitzer,
2013; Kravitz, Tye, & Kreitzer, 2012). The main goal of the two pathways is to modulate the
activity of the thalamus, which normally sends inhibitory signals to the motor cortex when it is
active. Specifically, the direct pathway is to facilitate the initiation and execution of voluntary
movement while the indirect pathway is to prevent unwanted muscle contractions from
competing with voluntary movements.
When people are making decisions about movement, the motor cortex will send
commands to the striatum. The direct pathway goes from the striatum to globus pallidus internal
and the main goal is to inhibit the activation of the thalamus and take away the inhibitory signals
from thalamus to the motor cortex so that the proper functioning of this direct pathway results in
the natural initiation of movement (Freeze et al., 2013) (Figure 1B). The most crucial
neurotransmitter helping to regulate this pathway in the background is dopamine, going from the
substantia nigra to the striatum. When the substantia nigra is more active, it sends more
dopamine to inhibitory neurons in the striatum heading for the globus pallidus internal.
Dopamine binds at D1 receptors, leading to greater inhibition and a more active thalamus
(Williams et al., 2002). Excitatory neurons also travel from the STN to the substantia nigra and
excite the substantia nigra, allowing for a greater release of dopamine. For the indirect pathway,
responsible for the inhibition of movement, the goal is to control the thalamus by turning up
globus pallidus internal inhibition, preventing overexcitation of the motor cortex (Graybiel,
2000). By receiving the commands from motor cortex, striatum sends inhibitory signals to inhibit
5

the activation of globus pallidus external. Since the activation of globus pallidus external has
been inhibited, it has less control of the subthalamus nucleus (STN) so that the STN gets excited
and then the globus pallidus interal becomes more active. As a result, the thalamus becomes
more active. As a result, the active thalamus send more inhibitory signals to motor cortex so that
inhibitions happen (Figure 1A). The most crucial neurotransmitter helping to regulate these
pathways in the background is dopamine, going from the substantia nigra to the striatum.
Dopamine has an excitatory effect upon cells in the striatum that are part of the direct pathway.
This is via D1 receptors. Dopamine has an inhibitory effect upon striatal cells associated with the
indirect pathway. This is via D2 receptors. In other words, the direct pathway (which turns up
motor activity) is excited by dopamine while the indirect pathway (which turns down motor
activity) is inhibited.
In a typical paradigm about motor inhibition and initiation, people reactively to inhibit
their behaviors by reacting to the signal of stop (e.g., stop signal or NoGo signal), which is called
reactive control (Aron, 2011). More recently, researchers pointed out the proactive model of
motor initiation and inhibition, such that how a subject prepares to stop an upcoming response
tendencies (Aron, 2011). Proactive inhibitory control is generated according to the goals of the
subject rather than by an external cue. Neuroimaging studies have localized brain regions within
the fronto-basal ganglia network as a putative neural circuity underlying motor inhibition, which
includes the right inferior frontal cortex (rIFC), the dorsomedial frontal cortex (mainly presupplementary motor area, preSMA), STN, the striatum and the primary motor cortex (e.g.,
Aron et al., 2007; Aron, Robbins, & Poldrack, 2014; Bai, Mari, Vorbach, & Hallett, 2005; Kim
& Lee, 2011). Recently, a study combined the Go-NoGo paradigm and the monetary incentive
delay task to explore the interaction between prefrontal cognitive control system and the striatal
6

reward processing network regions in impulsivity. Their results suggested that increased
activation in the rIFC and decreased activation in the ventral striatum during the reward
anticipation were associated with successful inhibitions (Behan, Stone, & Garavan, 2015).
Moreover, their behavioral data suggested that the increased accuracy to NoGo signals was
associated with the slowed reaction to Go signals which indicated the proactive inhibition
process. These results were consistent with the proactive inhibition model which involves the
indirect neural pathway from the prefrontal cortex to caudate, and to the internal globus pallidus
which then projects to the internal globus pallidus prior to its output to the thalamus (Aron,
2011).

1.3.2 Hyper-direct Pathway
More recently, researchers proposed a third pathway, the hyper-direct pathway of motor
inhibition. Instead of going through striatum, hyper-direct pathway originates from the right
prefrontal regions and directly connects to STN (Aron et al., 2007; Chikazoe, 2010) (Figure
1C).When inhibitory commands are sent from cortex to STN, the activated STN send active
signals to the thalamus so that the thalamus send the inhibitory signals to the motor cortex.
Hyper-direct pathway is fast, and reactively cancels out and inhibits a motor command, which
has already been placed in motor cortex. This process is consistent with reactive motor control.
In neural imaging studies, researchers found the co-activation of rIFC and STN and their
activations were stronger with faster inhibitions (Aron & Poldrack, 2006). Swann et al. (2011)
suggested that deep brain stimulation of the STN can improve the performance in stop-signal
task in patients with Parkinson disease and increase their activation of rIFC as well. More
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recently, simultaneous fMRI and EEG data suggested the interaction between the theta power
from mid-frontal cortex and probability level can predict the activation of STN in a reward
learning task (Frank et al., 2015). These results gave evidence of the direct connection between
the frontal region and STN as the hyper-direct pathway.
Motor control and reward processing are highly interconnected. The motor system is
largely influenced by the neural circuitry of the reward-related motivational system as both
systems are largely modulated by the dopaminergic input from the midbrain to basal ganglia
nuclei (Wickens, 1990). The proactive direct and indirect pathway is in line with the role of
motivation in motor control such that when participants are uncertain about the identity of the
forthcoming stimulus, an adaptive strategy will be used to prepare for inhibition, to some extent,
based on their predictions and expectations to the upcoming signals. In other words, a not-yetinitiated action has to be restrained to a certain degree, which has been framed as the proactive
inhibitory control (Aron, 2011). As to the reactive control, not much work has been discussed.
The right prefrontal region reactively corrects movements, by canceling out and inhibiting a
motor command that has already been made (Aron et al., 2007; Chamhers, Garavan, & Bellgrove,
2009; Chikazoe, 2010). Because of this role of the right prefrontal region in reactive control, I
hypothesized that right prefrontal region need to work harder when subjects have a stronger
motivation to make the action so that it can cancel out the improper response impulsive.

1.3.3 Beta Oscillation in Motor Control and Motivational Process
Neural oscillation is rhythmic or repetitive neural activity in the central nervous system.
Neural oscillations in beta frequency band (15-30 Hz) across the cortico-basal ganglia network,
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especially the sensorimotor cortex and prefrontal cortex, have been widely studied in motor
control. Studies have shown that patterns of motor beta oscillations code for different movement
parameters modulating the initiation and inhibition of movement (see review Jenkinson & Brown,
2011). While decrease in beta band oscillations (desynchronization) initiates a movement,
increase in beta oscillations (synchronization) suppresses a movement (Kühn et al., 2004; Picazio
et al., 2014; Swann et al., 2012; Swann et al., 2011; Swann et al., 2009; Tan et al., 2015). To date,
significance of the motor beta oscillations has mostly been studied in the context of lower level
motor control focusing on how this neural signal encodes the kinematic properties of a
movement (Brittain & Brown, 2014; Jenkinson & Brown, 2011; Kilavik, Zaepffel, Brovelli,
MacKay, & Riehle, 2013). Only a handful of studies have started investigating their contribution
in the influence of higher-level decision processes, such as the effects of reward and risk level in
motor related decisions.
There are a few studies suggesting some evidence that people’s motivational status could
be reflected by the beta oscillation. Studies in clinical population such as patients with
Parkinson’s disease showed that loss of dopaminergic inputs to the striatum and leads to
impairments in motivation and learning from feedback (Foerde, Braun, Higgins, & Shohamy,
2014). Dopaminergic modulations have also demonstrated these apposing effects of beta
oscillations in motor initiation and inhibition (Gatev, Darbin, & Wichmann, 2006; Hammond,
Bergman, & Brown, 2007). The dopamine loss in Parkinsonism elevated the level of beta
frequency oscillations causing difficulty in initiating a movement, which could be mitigated by
dopaminergic medications (Gatev et al., 2006). One recent study investigated how reward level
can change people’s motivation of making effort to motion through beta oscillation (Meyniel &
Pessiglione, 2014). The participants were asked to apply motor effort in order to gain rewards
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and were allowed to adjust their own effort allocation by having a break or applying greater force
in order to gain as many rewards as possible. Their results showed that effort onset could be
predicted by beta desynchronization during the previous break time. Moreover, the incentive
reward increased movement effort measured by exerted force level through the magnitude of
beta desynchronization (Myerson, Baumann, & Green, 2014). This study shed light on the
relationship between reward and motor control. In addition, in a cued choice reaction task that a
cue provided information as to which hand to prepare for an upcoming response, results
suggested that the power of beta band decreased significantly followed by an effective cue
compared to an ineffective cue indicating the role of coding the information predicting the
coming motor response (Van Wijk, Daffertshofer, Roach, & Praamstra, 2008).
In sum, although some studies showed some indirect evidence of the role of coding
reward information in beta band oscillation across the cortico-basal ganglia network, the under
mechanism is still unclear. Also the neural literature has the gap of investigating the influence of
risk level on motor decisions. In the current studies, the second important goal is to investigate
how decision variables such as reward and risk associated with an action are coded in the beta
frequency oscillations and how these cortico-basal ganglia network work together in this process.

1.4 The Present Studies
The current thesis contained two studies. Study 1 was a behavioral study aiming at
developing a valid paradigm to study how reward and risk level influence people’s decisions of
speeded actions. A Speed-Rewarded version of the widely used Go-NoGo task was developed.
In this task, participants gained or lost points based on performance speed and accuracy. The
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analyses focused on how they trade-off between speed and accuracy based on different levels of
potential reward and perceived risk level associated with a speeded action. The hypotheses were
that there would be a systematic trade-off between speed and accuracy based on the expected
value of an action, which would be calculated by potential reward and perceived risk level
associated with the action.
In an effort to investigate the neural mechanism under this processing, EEG was recorded
in study 2 while the participants were playing the Speed-Rewarded Go-NoGo task. Specifically,
the analyses focused on the beta band (15-30 Hz) oscillation during the motor plan period and
the motor reaction period and examined how the beta oscillation coded the reward and risk level
in order to plan and execute the motor action through the motor pathways. The hypotheses were
that the patterns of EEG motor beta oscillations would vary across the different levels of reward
and risk reflecting different levels of motivation towards an action. Specifically, the level of beta
oscillations would be lower when the decision variables promoted a choice towards a “Go”
response (e.g. larger rewards and lower risk), whereas it would be higher when they promoted a
choice for a “NoGo” (e.g., smaller rewards and higher risk).
Additionally, I am interested in whether personality traits associated with risk-taking and
impulsive tendencies assessed via self-report measures, influenced the degree to which these
decision variables modulated motor beta oscillations. Previous studies suggested that individuals
with greater risk-taking and impulsive tendencies were less sensitive to losses and showed
greater motivation towards larger compared to smaller rewards (Bechara, Dolan, & Hindes, 2002;
Bornovalova et al., 2009). Therefore, I hypothesized that those individuals with greater risktaking and impulsive tendencies would show greater changes in beta power associated with
different levels of reward.
11

CHAPTER 2
STUDY 1: THE EFFECTS OF REWARD AND RISK LEVEL ASSOCIATED WITH
SPEEDED ACTIONS: A BEHAVIORAL STUDY
2.1. Participants
A total of 110 college students (20 males, 22.21+2.13 years) without a history of
psychiatric and neurological illness, or alcohol/drug dependence were recruited from University
of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA, United States. All study participants signed a written informed
consent in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki, approved by the UMass Institutional
Review Board before the experiment and received course credits for participation after
completion of the experiment.

2.2 Speed-Rewarded Go-NoGo Task
During the first phase of the task, participants completed a typical Go-NoGo task in
which Go signals appeared 80% of the time in a total of 100 trials. Response times (RT) to the
Go signals were used to calculate the RT categories for determining actual rewards in the SpeedRewarded Go-NoGo task in the second phase. Five RT categories were determined based on the
lognormal distribution of the Go signal RTs from the first phase (Category 1: RT < μ - 2σ;
Category 2: μ - 2σ < RT < μ - σ; Category 3: μ - σ < RT < μ; Category 4: μ < RT < μ + σ;
Category 5: RT ≥ μ + σ; μ and σ refers to the mean and standard deviation of the lognormal
distribution).
In the second phase of the task, participants performed the Speed-Rewarded Go-NoGo
task (Fig. 2). Participants were rewarded based on the speed and accuracy of response.
12

Throughout the task, participants were instructed to use their right index finger to press a button
on a response box. A faster response to a Go signal resulted in higher rewards, whereas an
incorrect response to a NoGo signal (i.e. false alarm) was punished by loss of reward points. On
each trial of the task, participants were first presented with a trial information cue. The cue
contained information about the amount of reward points they could earn - either 120 (high
reward) or 6 (low reward) - and the probability that a Go signal would appear in that trial as
described in a pie-chart (Go-probability: 20, 50 or 80%). Following the presentation of a trial
information cue, the screen displayed a “READY!” sign for a variable time window (1000-1500
msec), which prompted the participants to prepare for a response. A Go (geometric shape in blue)
or NoGo (same geometric shape in gray) signal, determined by the Go signal probability, was
presented in the following screen. After participant’s response, the actual reward amount that the
participant won based on his/her performance was displayed. A correct response to a Go signal
was rewarded based on RT using the pre-defined RT category from the first phase. For trials that
met the RT category 1, the total point at stake (either 120 or 6) was awarded. For trials that fall
under RT category 2, 3, 4 and 5, points were discounted to 50%, 25%, 12.5% and 0% of the total
point respectively. Correct responses to a NoGo signal did not result in any rewards. However,
an incorrect response to a NoGo signal (i.e. false alarm) would result in a loss of the total points
at stake (i.e. results in -120 or -6). Thus, the decision to Go entailed a risk for resulting in
negative points. The Go-probability can therefore be considered as a metric based on which the
participants can assess the risk of negative outcomes associated with the Go decision. A fixation
cue was displayed during inter-trial interval. There were 6 blocks with 192 trials in total (32
trials in each block: 4 trials with low reward and 20% Go-probability; 8 trials with low reward
and 50% Go-probability; 4 trials with low reward and 80% Go-probability; 4 trials with high
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reward and 20% Go-probability; 8 trials with high reward and 50% Go-probability; 4 trials with
high reward with 80% Go-probability). After each block, participants were shown the
accumulated amount of points they’ve earned up until the previous block.

2.3 Behavioral Psychometric Measures
In an effort to determine how individual differences in personality traits related with
impulsivity and risk taking contributes in performance during Speed-Rewarded Go-NoGo task,
each participant was asked to fill the following additional scales.
Behavioral Inhibition & Activation Scale (BIS/BAS). The BIS/BAS contains 24 items and
yields 4 factors measuring the behavioral inhibition system and behavioral active system (Carver
& White, 1994). The four factors include Drive, Fun Seeking, Reward Responsiveness, and
Behavioral Inhibition. Participants are asked to rate each item with a 4-point Likert scale.
Barratt Impulsiveness Scale (BIS). BIS is a 30 item self-report instrument designed to
assess the personality/behavioral construct of impulsiveness. It has the following 3 factors:
Factor 1 (motor impulsivity); Factor 2 (non-planning impulsiveness); Factor 3 (attentional
impulsiveness) (Barratt, Monahan, & Steadman, 1994). Participants are asked to rate each item
with a 4-point Likert scale.
Gambling Related Cognitions Scale (GRCS). GRCS contains 23 items in communitybased population with five factors: Gambling expectancies, Illusion of control, Predictive control,
Inability to stop gambling, and Interpretive bias (Raylu & Oei, 2004). Participants are asked to
rate each item with a 7-point Likert scale.
Delay Discounting Task. The participants will choose between getting a relatively small
14

amount of money today or getting a relatively large amount of money in the future (Kirby, Petry,
& Bickel, 1999). Here is a sample question “Would you prefer $ 54 today, or $ 55 in 117 days?”
There were 27 items in this task. The delay discounting rate (value k) in the study was fitted to
Mazur's (1987) hyperbolic equation: V=A / (1+kD). This equation describes how the subjective
value (V) of a reward (A) is discounted as a function of delay (D) (Mazur, 1987). High k value
indicated high delay discounting rate.

2.4 Results
I analyzed the reaction time to the Go signals and the false alarm rates (the proportion of
incorrect responses to NoGo signals) in each experimental condition as displayed in Table 1.
Since different categories for reward size were based on the standard deviation of reaction time
of each participant, Z-scored RTs were used for all the analyses. Raw RTs within each individual
were log-transformed, after which they were converted into Z-scores across all the conditions.

2.4.1 The Effect of Reward and Go-Probability
A set of 2 (Reward: High, Low) x 3 (Go-probability: 20%, 50%, 80%) within subject
ANOVA was performed for the RT to Go signals, the false alarm rates to NoGo signals as well
as the speed-accuracy trade-off measure. For RT, there was a main effect of Reward (F(1,99) =
27.684, p < .001, η2 = .219, Mlow = .264, Mhigh = .033) and Probability (F(2,198) = 88.487, p
< .001, η2 = .472), as well as the interaction between Reward and Probability(F(2, 198) = 6.572,
p = .002, η2 = .062) (Fig. 3A). Post-hoc analysis suggested that when the Go-probability was
relatively low (20%), there was no significant difference between RT for high reward compared
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to the low reward conditions (p = .111). When the Go-probability was 50% and 80%, RT was
significantly faster for high reward condition compared to low reward condition (both ps < .001,
with Bonforroni correction). These results suggested that the effect of reward on speed was
modulated by the assessed level of risk as described in the Go-probability. Speeding up for larger
reward only happened when the Go-probability was 50% or above (i.e. when the risk for losing
associated with false alarm was low).
For the false alarm rate, there was a significant main effect of Go-probability (F(2,218) =
91.872, p < .001, η2 = .457). False alarm rate was higher in 80% probability condition (M = .305)
than in 50% probability condition (M = .131), and it was higher in 50% probability condition
than in 20% probability condition (M = .054) (all ps < .001, with Bonforroni correction). The
main effect of reward (F(1,109) = 2.571, p > .10, η2 = .023, Mlow = .154, Mhigh = .172) and the
interaction between reward and probability (F(2,218) = 1.144, p > .10, η2 = .010) were not
significant (Fig. 3B). These results suggest that there was a greater tendency to take risks
associated with a speeded Go response when there was an explicitly known low probability for
losing due to false alarm (i.e. high Go signal probability).
Whether reward and risk systematically influenced the speed-accuracy trade-off was also
examined. The following formula as an index of speed–accuracy trade-off (Fitts, 1954):
1/RT*ACC. In order to keep all the RT values positive, to be used in the speed-accuracy tradeoff measure, exponential function was applied to the RT Z-scores. The higher value of the tradeoff measure indicates that participants prefer to trade accuracy for faster response and the lower
value means that participants prefer to trade speed for higher accuracy. The average speedaccuracy trade-off measure in different reward and Go-probability conditions was displayed in
Table 1. For the speed accuracy trade-off, there was a significant main effect of reward (F(1,88)
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= 11.261, p = .001, η2 = .113) and Go-probability (F(2,176) = 62.506, p < .001, η2 = .415) as
well as the interaction between them (F(2,176) = 5.09, p = .007, η2 = .055) (Fig. 3C). The simple
effect analysis suggested that when the Go-probability was 20%, there was no significant
difference between high and low reward condition (p = .77). When the Go-probability is 50%
and 80%, the speed-accuracy trade-off was higher in high reward condition compared to low
reward condition (for 50% Go-probability, p < .001, for 80% Go-probability, p = .007, with
Bonforroni correction). Consistent with the results from response time, these results suggested
that the effect of reward on movement speed was modulated by the assessed level of risk as
described in the Go-probability. When the Go-probability was high (50% or 80%), the risk for
losing associated with false alarm was low, participants preferred to trade off accuracy in order
to response faster in order to get the high reward.

2.4.2 Contribution of Risk-taking and Impulsive Traits in Speed-Rewarded Go-NoGo
Performance
Correlation analyses were conducted between the measures of risk-taking and impulsive
traits, and the performance measures of Speed-Rewarded Go-NoGo task. The results were
displayed in Table 2 and Table 3. Significantly positive correlations with the false alarm rate
were found in the GRCS and delay discounting (Table 2). Significant negative correlation with
the RT was found in BIS (Table 3). No significant relationships were found between speedaccuracy trade-off and any of the risk-taking and impulsive trait measures.
In general, the overall false alarm rate was positively correlated with the total score of
GRCS (r = .219, p = .023, Fig. 4A). This suggested that people with higher gambling-oriented
cognition style have greater tendency to take risks. Further correlation analyses were conducted
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between GRCS and the false alarm rates in different reward and probability conditions. The
results suggested that in the high probability condition (80%), there was a significant correlation
between false alarm rate and the total score of GRCS (r = .192, p = .046). But in the 20% and 50%
probability conditions, there were no significant correlations. Also with low reward, there was
significant correlation between the false alarm rate and the total score of GRCS (r = .255, p
= .008). But no significant correlation was found with high reward condition.
The delay-discounting rate was significantly correlated with the overall false alarm rate (r
= .241, p = .013, Fig. 4B), indicating that individuals with larger delay discounting rate, took
more risks. Across different Go signal probability conditions significant correlations were found
in 20% (r = .218, p = .024) and 80% (r = .229, p = .018) probability conditions. No significant
correlation was found in the 50% probability condition. Across different reward levels, in low
the reward condition, there was a significant correlation between false alarm rate and delay
discounting rate (r = .256, p = .008). No significant correlation was found with high reward
condition.
There was a significant negative correlation between the RT and BIS in BIS/BAS (r = .199, p = .05, Fig. 4C), indicating that individuals with greater behavioral avoidance (behavioral
inhibition system) would respond faster. Further correlation analyses were conducted between
BIS/BAS and the RT in different reward and probability conditions. For BIS subscale, there was
not any significant correlations across different reward and Go-probability conditions. But there
was a positive correlation between BAS and the RT in low reward condition (r = .203, p = .047).
This suggested that individuals with greater behavioral approach system (behavioral activation
system) would respond slower in low reward condition. But no significant correlation was found
in high reward condition as well as the different Go-probability conditions.
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In an effort to determine whether the relationship with the risk-taking and impulsive trait
measures differently change across reward level Go-probabilities, I calculated the difference in
false alarm rate between high and low reward conditions separately in each probability condition
and looked at the correlation between this difference measure with the risk-taking and impulsive
trait measures. The results showed that in the 20% probability condition, the difference of false
alarm rate between the high and low reward conditions were negatively correlated with total
score of GRCS (r = -.281, p = .003, Fig. 4D). With 50% and 80% probability conditions, no
significant correlations were found. This indicated that the effect of reward on increasing false
alarm rate was greater for people who demonstrated less gambling oriented cognition styles and
that this effect was specific when the Go signal probability was low. No significant correlations
were found with the delay-discounting rate and BIS/BAS.
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CHAPTER 3
STUDY 2: THE EFFECTS OF REWARD AND RISK LEVEL ASSOCIATED WITH
SPEEDED ACTIONS: THE ROLE OF BETA OSCILLATIONS
3.1 Participants
A total of 31 right-handed college students (26 females, 19.70 ± 1.08 yrs) without any
history of psychiatric or neurological illnesses were recruited from the University of
Massachusetts, Amherst. All study participants signed a written informed consent, approved by
the UMass Institutional Review Board. Participants performed the Speed-Rewarded Go-NoGo
task while EEG was collected continuously. Participants received course credits for participation
after completion of the experiment. In addition to the flat rate of credit for participation itself, an
extra bonus credit – 25% of the flat rate – was granted based on the reward points they earned
throughout the Speed-Rewarded Go-NoGo task.

3.2 Speed-Rewarded Go-NoGo Task
The participants performed same task as Study 1. There were six blocks with 288 trials in
total (48 trials in each block with 8 trials per each reward level and Go-probability combination).
After each block, participants were shown the accumulated amount of points they’ve earned up
until the previous block.

3.3 EEG Recording and Analysis
The electroencephalogram (EEG) was continuously recorded using 64 scalp electrodes
embedded in an extended coverage, triangulated equidistant cap (M10, EasyCap, GmbH) using a
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low-pass filter of 100 Hz at a sampling rate of 1000 Hz (actiCHamp, Brain Products, GmbH).
The electro-oculogram (EOG) was monitored with electrodes below the left eye and just lateral
to the left and right canthi. Electrode impedances were kept below 25 kΩ. The EEG was
amplified with a BrainAmp system (Brain Products GmbH, Gilching, Germany). All channels
were referenced to the vertex (Cz) during recording.
Offline EEG data were exported to Matlab using the EEGLAB software package
(Delorme & Makeig, 2004), and custom scripts. The data were re-referenced to the average of
mastoid channels and high-pass filtered by 0.1 Hz. Then I separated the remaining data into two
epochs. First epoch was time-locked to the presentation of the trial information, spanning from 1
s prior to and 4.5 s after the onset of the trial information. This epoch includes the 2.5 s Trial
Information period as well as the 2 s of Ready period. These two periods share the same baseline
which was 1 s duration before the onset of trial information. The second epoch was time-locked
to the presentation of the Go/NoGo signal, spanning from 200 ms prior to and 800 ms after the
onset of the Go/NoGo signal (Go/NoGo period). A pre-stimulus period of 200 ms was used as
the baseline. For each participant, artifact noise was removed based on an independent
component analysis (ICA) approach (Delorme, Palmer, Onton, Oostenveld, & Makeig, 2012;
Makeig, Debener, Onton, & Delorme, 2004; Onton & Makeig, 2006) that has been established
previously to obtain EEG data, which greatly diminished contribution from ocular/biophysical
artifacts. Single trials were also visually inspected to exclude epochs with excessively noisy EEG
or muscle artifacts.
Time-frequency analysis of the EEG data was performed using the timef function of the
EEGLAB toolbox (Delorme & Makeig, 2004). Oscillatory power in beta band was calculated by
means of Fast Fourier Transformation and the mean event-related (log) spectral perturbation
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(ERSP) was computed with respect to the specific pre-stimulus period as baseline (i.e. -1000 to 0
ms for Trial Information and Ready period and -200 to 0 ms for Go/NoGo signal period). The
epoch became -488 ms to 3988 ms for the Trial Information and Ready period and -136 ms to
736 ms for Go/NoGo signal period.
The analyses focused on the pre-selected electrodes relevant to the proactive and reactive
motor control. Specifically, these electrodes of interest encompass the left primary motor region
contralateral to the right hand used for the response (C3, C5, CP3, CP5) (Deiber et al., 2012) and
the right prefrontal region (F6, F8, FC6) (Swann et al., 2011). Signals from all of the electrodes
were averaged within the motor and right frontal regions as in previous literature (Deiber et al.,
2012; Swann et al., 2011). Statistical analyses were performed separately in the following three
periods; Trial Information, Ready and the Go/NoGo period on mean ERSP values in beta
frequency band. In order to determine the time window that shows significant effects associated
with reward and risk level, a point-by-point 2 (Reward: High, Low) x 3 (Go-probability: 25%,
50%, 75%) repeated measures ANOVA was performed within each period. After the specific
time windows were determined, statistics were reported based on the average across all time
points within the identified time window.

3.4 Behavior Psychometric Measures
Based on the results in study 1, the change of behavioral performance between high and
low reward condition was only predicted by GRCS. Therefore, in study 2, only GRCS was
measured as the personality traits related with risk-taking and impulsive tendencies.
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3.5 Results
3.5.1 Behavioral Results
The reaction time and the false alarm rates (the proportion of incorrect responses to
NoGo signals) were analyzed in each experimental condition. Since different categories for the
actual reward size were based on the standard deviation of the reaction times, Z-scored RTs were
used for all the analyses as in study1 (X.-J. Chen & Kwak, 2017). Raw RTs within each
individual were log-transformed, after which they were converted into Z-scores.
A set of 2 (Reward: High, Low) x 3 (Go-probability: 25%, 50%, 75%) repeated measures
ANOVA for the RT to Go signals and the false alarm rate to NoGo signals were performed to
determine how reward and Go-probability influence behavioral performance. For RT, there was
a main effect of Reward (F(1,30) = 53.15, p < .001, η2 = .64, Mlow = .34, Mhigh = -.03) and Goprobability (F(2,60) = 43.62, p < .001, η2 = .59, M25 = .38, M50 = .19, M75 = -.13), as well as the
interaction between Reward and Go-probability (F(2,60) = 14.44, p < .001, η2 = .33) (Fig. 5A).
Pairwise comparisons suggested that across the three levels of Go-probability (25%, 50%, 75%),
RT was significantly faster for high reward compared to low reward condition (25% Goprobability, p = .016, 50% and 75% Go probability: both p values < .001, with Sidak Bonforroni
correction). These results suggest that the effect of reward on speed was modulated by the
assessed level of risk as described in the Go-probability. Speeding up for larger reward only
happened as the Go-probability increased (i.e. when the risk for losing associated with false
alarm decreased).
For the false alarm rate, there was a significant main effect of Go-probability (F(2,60) =
32.73, p < .001, η2 = .52, M25 = .04, M50 = .11, M75 = .26) (Fig. 5B). False alarm rate was higher
in 75% than in 50% Go-probability, and in 50% than in 25% Go-probability (all p values < .001).
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The main effect of Reward (F(1,30) < 1, p = .390, Mlow = .13, Mhigh = .14) and the interaction
between Reward and Go-probability (F(2,60) < 1, p = .381) were not significant. These results
suggest that there was a greater tendency to take risks associated with a speeded Go response
when the probability of losing was lower (i.e. higher Go-probability).
The analysis also examined whether reward and risk systematically influenced the speed–
accuracy trade-off using the following formula as an index of speed–accuracy trade-off: 1/RT x
ACC as in the previous study (Chen & Kwak, 2017). In order to keep all the RT values positive
to be used in the speed–accuracy trade-off measure, exponential function was applied to the RT
Z-scores. The higher value of the trade-off measure indicates greater preference to trade accuracy
for faster response and the lower value indicates greater preference to trade speed for higher
accuracy. Reward by Go-probability repeated measures ANOVA showed a significant main
effect of reward (F(1,30) = 34.31, p < .001, η2 = .53, Mlow = 47, Mhigh = .62) and the interaction
between them (F(2,60) = 5.66, p = .006, η2 = .16) (Fig. 5C), suggesting a systematic trade-off
between reward and risk level on decisions for speeded actions. Participants showed a greater
tendency to go faster at the expense of sacrificing the accuracy as the reward stakes increased.
This effect of reward magnitude was more significant in higher than lower Go-probabilites (p
= .013 when Go-probability = 25%, p = .001 when Go-probability = 50%, p < .001 when Goprobability = 75%, with Sidak Bonforroni correction). The main effect of Go-probability was not
significant (F(2,60) < 1, p = .581).
Next, I determined whether the task performance predicts individual’s risk-taking and
impulsive tendencies. Based on prior studies suggesting greater sensitivity to reward magnitudes
associated with risk-taking and impulsive tendencies (Bechara, Dolan, & Hindes, 2002;
Bornovalova et al., 2009), the analysis was focused on the effect of reward magnitude. To this
24

end, I computed the difference in false alarm rate and RT as well as the speed-accuracy trade-off
measure between high and low reward conditions averaged across the three Go-probabilities and
looked at the correlation between this difference measure and self-report psychometric measures.
Difference in false alarm rate across high and low reward conditions was positively correlated
with Gambling Expectation sub-score (r = .517, p = .003) and the total score (r = .378, p = .036)
of GRCS. Overall the behavioral findings were consistent with the study1 (Chen & Kwak, 2017).

3.5.2 EEG results
3.5.2.1 EEG beta band activity during Trial Information and Ready Period
During Trial Information Period, time frequency map from both the left sensorimotor and
right frontal regions showed a marked decrease in beta power after the onset of the Trial
Information cue lasting until about 1500 ms (Fig. 6 A and B, Fig. 7 A and B). Thus, the analysis
was focused within this time period for both regions. In the left sensorimotor region, point-bypoint 2 (Reward: High, Low) x 3 (Go-probability: 25%, 50%, 75%) repeated measures ANOVA
showed a significant main effect of Reward from 645 ms to 1195 ms after the onset of Trial
Information cue (F(1,30) = 11.21, p = .002, η2 = .27, Mlow = -0.22, Mhigh = -0.30, Fig. 6C) and a
significant main effect of Go-probability between 400-1175 ms after the onset of Trial
Information cue (F(1,60) = 11.04, p < .001, η2 = .27, M25 = -0.27, M50= -0.29, M75 = -0.52, Fig.
6D). Post-hoc analysis suggested that the difference between 25% and 50% Go-probability
condition was not significant (p = .768) whereas the beta power in 75% Go-probability condition
was significantly lower than the other two conditions (both p values < .001). No significant
interaction was found during Trial Information period.
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Similar pattern was found in the right prefrontal region during Trial Information Period.
Point-by-point 2 (Reward: High, Low) x 3 (Go-probability: 25%, 50%, 75%) repeated measures
ANOVA showed a main effect of Reward between 765-1005 ms after the onset of Trial
Information cue (F(1,30) = 4.86, p = .035, η2 = .14, Mlow = -0.12, Mhigh = -0.22, Fig. 7C) and a
main effect of Go-probability was found between 905-1275 ms after the onset of Trial
Information cue (F(1,60) = 5.27, p = .008, η2 = .15, M25 = -0.10, M50= -0.07, M75 = -0.23) (Fig.
7D). Post-hoc analysis suggested that beta power in 75% Go-probability condition was
significantly lower than the 25% (p = .018) and 50% Go-probability condition (p = .008).
During Ready Period, time frequency maps from the left sensorimotor and right frontal
regions showed a marked decrease in beta power across the entire period which lasts 1500 ms
(Fig. 6 A and B, Fig. 7 A and B). Thus the analysis was performed across the whole period. In
left sensorimotor region, point-by-point 2 (Reward: High, Low) x 3 (Go-probability: 25%, 50%,
75%) repeated measures ANOVA only showed a main effect of Go-probability between 275-495
ms after the Ready onset (F(1, 60) = 3.32, p = .043, η2 = .10, M25 = -0.43, M50= -0.46, M75 = 0.62, Fig. 6E). Post hoc analysis suggested that the beta power with 75% Go-probability was
significantly lower compared to the 25% Go-probability condition (p = .024). The difference
between 25% and 50% Go-probability conditions (p = .653) as well as the difference between 50%
and 75% Go-probability conditions (p = .063) were not significant. No significant main effect of
Reward or interaction were found. In the right prefrontal region, there was a significant main
effect of Reward between 1185-1420 ms after the onset of Ready (F(1,30) = 5.10, p = .031, η2
= .15, Mlow = -0.16, Mhigh = -0.27, Fig. 7E). The main effect of Go-probability and the interaction
were not significant.
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3.5.2.2 EEG beta band activity during Go/NoGo period
The trials in Go/NoGo period could further be divided into trials when a Go signal was
presented (Go trials) and trials when a NoGo signal was presented (NoGo trials). Previous
literature suggested that beta power was modulated by efforts placed for motor inhibition (Swann
et al., 2009, 2011; Wagner, Wessel, Ghahremani, & Aron, 2017). Based on these reports, I
computed the difference in mean beta power between the two trial types (beta power NoGo – Go;
beta power in NoGo trials – beta power in Go trials) and determined whether there was a
modulation by Reward and Go-probability in this difference measure. The greater the value in
this difference measure would reflect greater effort placed for adequate motor inhibition. Thus, I
interpreted this measure as matric of inhibitory motor effort. I hypothesized that in general, if the
Trial Information led to a greater motivation towards a Go response, it would require a greater
inhibitory effort in face of an actual NoGo signal and thus beta power NoGo – Go will be higher. In
the analysis, trials with only correct responses were included, excluding the false alarms trials
and the missed trials where no responses were made to the Go signal. In determining the specific
time period for analysis, the common time window prior to the actual Go response across all
participants to account for individual differences in RT was investigated. Specifically, the first
200 ms from the onset of the Go/NoGo signal, which was the minimum average RT across all
participants, was analyzed.
In order to examine how Reward and Go-probability modulated beta power NoGo – Go in
left motor region, initial inspection of the results revealed no specific time point at which the
patterns of beta frequency power were distinguishable across the Reward and Go-probability
conditions. 2 (Reward: high, low) x 3 (Go-probability: 25%, 50%, 75%) repeated measures
ANOVA did not show any main or interaction effects.
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As opposed to the left motor region, there was a marked difference in the patterns of beta
frequency power in the right frontal region. Point-by-point 2 (Reward: high, low) x 3 (Goprobability: 25%, 50%, 75%) repeated measures ANOVA showed a significant main effect of
Reward between 110-135 ms after the onset of the Go/NoGo signal (F(1,30) = 5.29, p = .029, η2
= .15, Mlow = -0.24, Mhigh = 0.23, Fig. 8B). Furthermore, a significant Reward by Go-probability
interaction was found between 135-160 ms after the onset of the Go/NoGo signal (F(2,60) = 3.40,
p = .040 , η2 = .10, Fig. 8A, C). Post-hoc analysis showed that in 75% Go-probability condition,
beta power NoGo – Go was significantly greater in high compared to low reward condition (p = .038,
with Sidak Bonforroni correction) while in 25% and 50% Go-probability condition, there was no
significant difference between high and low reward condition (both p values > .05). No
significant main effect of Go-probability was found.

3.5.2.3 EEG Beta band activity predict performance on Speed-Rewarded Go/NoGo task
In order to determine whether the beta frequency oscillations in the left motor and right
frontal regions influenced behavioral performance to the forthcoming Go/NoGo signal, linear
mixed effect model was used. I hypothesized that the difference in behavioral performance (i.e.
FA and RT) across Reward and Go-probability conditions will be predicted by difference in beta
power across these conditions. To simplify our interpretations, a model that predicts the
difference in performance across the high and low reward conditions from the difference in beta
oscillations across the two reward conditions was created below.
Performdiffij = 1Probj + 2Betadiffij + 3Probj x Betadiffij + γ1Probj + εij (i = subject i, j = Goprobability j, ε = error term)
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Difference in response time (RT), false alarm rate (FA) and speed-accuracy tradeoff (SA)
across the high and low reward conditions (Performdiff: high – low RT (RTdiff), high – low FA
(FAdiff), high – low SA (SAdiff)) were the dependent variables for each model. Go-probability
(Prob), difference in beta power across high and low reward conditions (Betadiff: high – low
beta power) and the interaction between the two (Prob x Betadiff) were included as fixed-effect
variables predicting Performdiff. Go-probability was included in the model to account for the
fact that each subject had its own set of random parameters associated with the random effect
“Prob” (γ1Probj). Separate models were tested for Betadiff derived from motor and right frontal
regions in the Trial Information, Ready and Go/NoGo period. Mean beta power was extracted
from the time window that showed significant effects associated with Reward. As for the
Go/NoGo period, Betadiff was computed using the derived metric of inhibitory motor effort
(beta power NoGo – Go). Only significant results were reported below.
During Ready period, there was a significant interaction between Betadiff in right frontal
region and Go-probability in predicting FAdiff (F(2,64.9) = 4.85, p = .01). Reward-associated
increase in FA was predicted by reward-associated decrease in beta power, most reliably in 50%
Go-probability (see Fig. 9A). During the Go/NoGo period, there was a significant main effect of
Betadiff (F(1,71.00) = 4.32, p = .041) and an interaction between Betadiff and Go-probability
(F(2,51.37) = 3.51, p = .037) in the right frontal region. Increase in FA was predicted by lower
levels of inhibitory motor efforts most reliably in 75% Go-probability (see Fig. 9B).

3.5.2.4 Beta Oscillation predicts individual difference in risk-taking and impulsive tendencies.
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Correlation analyses were conducted to test if the beta power from left sensorimotor rand
right prefrontal region can predict individual’s risk taking and impulsive tendencies. I
hypothesized that people with stronger risk taking and impulsive tendencies would be more
sensitive to reward magnitudes reflected by the difference in beta power across the high and low
reward conditions. In the analysis investigating the relationship between the psychometric
measures and the behavioral performance (i.e. RT, FA and SA during Speed-Rewarded
Go/NoGo task), the results with the Gambling Expectation subscore and the total score of GRCS
as reported earlier were significant. Thus, only these two psychometric measures (PsychM) were
included in the analyses. Similar to the correlation analyses between the psychometric measures
and behavioral performance, I calculated the different beta power between high and low reward
conditions and averaged them across the three Go-probabilities.
During the Trial Information period, there was a significant negative correlation between
Gambling Expectation sub-score and the difference beta power in left sensorimotor region (r
= .52, p = .003, Fig. 9C). Similar pattern was found in right prefrontal region during the Ready
period, there was a negative correlation between Betadiff and Go-probability and Gambling
Expectation sub-score (r = .40, p = .026, Fig. 9D).
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CHAPTER 4
DISCUSSION
The two studies in the current thesis aimed to explore the effect of reward and risk on
decisions for speeded actions and the underlying neural bases.
In Chapter 2, I described a task paradigm designed to investigate how decision making
for speeded motor responses can vary across different levels of the potential rewards and risks. In
this task, faster responses would result in higher rewards while at the same time it also entailed a
higher risk of losing rewards due to false alarm. The behavioral results showed that higher
rewards motivated people to respond faster, and this effect was modulated by the Go-probability
which explicitly influenced the perceived risk associated with the action. Specifically, when the
probability of Go signals was relatively high (the perceived risk level was low), the higher
rewards led to significantly faster response to Go signals whereas the modulatory effect of
reward was not significant when the probability of Go signals was low. More importantly as
shown by the results of the speed-accuracy trade-off measure, there was a greater sacrifice for
accuracy in favor of speed when the response was associated with higher potential reward and
when the perceived risk level was low (i.e. higher Go-probability). These results suggest that
decisions for a speeded action is determined by a systematic trade-off between cost and benefit
associated with an action, which is based on the potential reward and risk level, the two
determinants of the action value.
These results were in line with previous studies showing the powerful motivational role
of monetary rewards in the conscious selection of actions (Ballanger et al., 2006; Kurniawan et
al., 2010; Meyniel & Pessiglione, 2014; Skvortsova et al., 2014). In the present study, the level
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of potential rewards was presented as either high or low and the actual amount of reward was
proportionally deducted from the potential reward based on the speed of the response. As
expected, higher rewards resulted in faster responses suggesting an increase in motivation. Faster
responses, however is inevitably associated with higher risk of incorrect responses as generally
depicted in speed-accuracy trade-off (Fitts, 1954), which is readily acknowledged in our
everyday decision making as implied in the idiom “Haste makes waste”. In the task, the risk
associated with speed was formalized by imposing a loss of points when there was a false alarm,
a feature that adds on an ecological validity to the ask. The results showed that decisions on
speeded actions were also made based on the potential rewards to gain as well as the associated
risk level similar to the way economic choices are made. Specifically, as preparing for a faster
response introduces higher risk of failure to inhibit the action which may result in loss of points,
participants only decided to speed up when the known probability of losing is low (i.e. higher Go
signal probability).
In Chapter 3, I described how motor beta frequency oscillations were modulated by the
different levels of rewards and risks. Analysis of neural signals from EEG data focused on the
beta frequency oscillations involved in motor control. Specifically, the analyses focused on the
sensorimotor and right frontal regions each representing the neural circuitry of proactive and
reactive motor control (Aron, 2011). While EEG has low spatial resolution and it is difficult to
map out the neuroanatomical origins of the EEG signal, many studies have reliably interpreted
the EEG beta oscillations close to the primary motor cortex (e.g. C3, C5, CP3, CP5) as the
sensorimotor rhythm (Deiber et al., 2012; López-Larraz et al., 2015; Picazio et al., 2014). EEG
beta signal from the right frontal region has also been well identified as reflecting the activity of
the reactive stopping network (Swann et al., 2011). Consistent with behavioral results, motor
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beta oscillations reflected the differential levels of motivation towards a Go vs. NoGo response
across different reward and risk levels. In general, lower beta power was associated with higher
reward and lower risk level, which was consistent with prior research showing decrease in beta
oscillations associated with initiating a movement and increase in beta oscillations associated
with inhibiting a movement (Kuhn et al., 2004; Picazio et al., 2014; Swann et al., 2011, 2009;
Tan et al., 2015). Functional relevance of these beta signals in task performance also supports
this interpretation; greater reward-related decrease in beta oscillations in the right frontal region
during ready period predicted greater reward-related increase in false alarm rate.
One advantage of EEG is allowing investigation of the dynamic changes of a
psychological process. The Speed-Rewarded task were divided into three phases including the
Trial Information period, Ready period and the Go/NoGo period in order to examine how
individuals preprocess the information cue, prepare the motor actions and react to the actual
motor signals. During the Trial Information period, comparisons of the EEG data across different
reward and risk levels suggested that the motor beta oscillations coded the reward and risk level
information. With greater amount of reward points, people showed more decrease of beta power
from the sensorimotor cortex. Similarly, with higher possibility to a Go signal, people also
showed more decrease of beta power in sensorimotor cortex. Same patterns happened in the right
prefrontal region during this period. The current data demonstrate that beta oscillation
contributes in processing higher-level decision variables such as the risk and rewards associated
with an action. The involvement of both sensorimotor and prefrontal region gave evidence of
proactive role of the “stopping network” happened during the Trial Information process. During
the Ready period, there was a significant effect of Reward on the beta band oscillatory activity
from right prefrontal region but not in sensorimotor cortex. Significant effect of Go-probability
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was only found in left sensorimotor cortex, which was consistent with previous studies that the
power of beta band decreased significantly followed by an effective cue compared to an
ineffective cue (Van Wijk et al., 2008) indicating the role of coding the information predicting
the coming motor response.
It was also of note that even within the preparatory periods when participants processed
Trial Information and gets Ready for the upcoming signal, I observed distinct contributions of
the two brain regions. While both reward and risk information were coded in both regions during
Trial Information period, the two variables were separately coded by the two regions by Ready
period with risk information in the motor region and reward information in the right frontal
region. The reward information, which entails direct motivational value towards a Go response,
is constantly being monitored by the reactive control system so that when necessary – for
example when facing an actual NoGo signal – it can appropriately inhibit responses. The risk
information, which is expressed as Go-probabilities in the current paradigm, can be more
intuitively coded by the proactive mechanism in motor region as it plans out a motor command
based on the degree to which the Go signal is expected.
More interesting, the beta oscillation could also predict individual differences in risktaking and impulsive tendencies as assessed by self-report measures. During Trial Information
period, individuals with greater pro-gambling cognitive orientation, measured by Gambling
Related Cognition Scale (GRCS) (Raylu & Oei, 2004) showed greater decrease in beta power in
the sensorimotor cortex in high compared to low reward stakes. This provides the neural
evidence indicating that individuals with greater pro-gambling cognitive tendencies are not
capable of adequately adjusting their behaviors in response to high stakes of reward especially
during the earlier Trial Information processing period. They have greater motivation towards
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larger rewards and at the same time have less sufficient inhibitory control mechanism in place
which is often reported as a hallmark of impulsivity (Beck et al., 2009; Martin & Potts, 2004;
Scheres, Milham, Knutson, & Castellanos, 2007). But the beta oscillation during Trial
Information period could not predict any behavioral performance in the Speeded-Reward GoNoGo task. While during the Ready period, in addition to predicting individual difference in risk
taking and impulsive tendencies, the change of beta power between high and low reward
conditions from right prefrontal region can also effectively predict the later false alarm rate in
Speed-Rewarded Go/NoGo task. These results confirm the proactive role of prefrontal cortex
that during the Ready period, the prefrontal regions may play a role of motor plan based on the
Trial Information and suggested the proactive control from prefrontal lobe in motor inhibition
(Aron, 2011; Aron et al., 2007). Future studies are required to directly specify the separable
contributions of the two control mechanisms in processing reward and risk information to
confirm these hypotheses.
As previous literature suggested, the right prefrontal region reactively corrects
movements, by canceling out and inhibiting a motor command that has already been made (Aron
et al., 2007; Chambers, Garavan, & Bellgrove, 2009; Chikazoe, 2010). Because of this role of the
right prefrontal region in reactive control, I hypothesized that the modulatory effects of the
different reward and Go-probability conditions would primarily be found after the Go/NoGo
signal. Specifically, when facing an actual NoGo signal, the load that was placed in this region to
inhibit a response would be greater when there was a greater motivation to “Go” based on the
Trial Information. Thus, I hypothesized that the beta signals in the right prefrontal regions would
manifest a greater effort to inhibit when the expected values for a “Go” response was higher as
indicated during Trial Information period. The data supported this hypothesis. The inhibitory
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effort – indexed by beta power NoGo-Go – was higher for high stakes compared to low stakes. And
main effect of reward was modulated by the Go-probability condition. Specifically, greater
inhibitory effort was made for high reward compared to low reward with 75% Go-probability,
whereas no such difference was found with 50% or 25% Go-probability. More importantly, the
beta signals predicted behavioral performance to the Go/NoGo signal. These results collectively
demonstrate that the decision variable such as reward value and the risk level can shape the
motor system by modulating the neural oscillation patterns involved in the proactive and reactive
control, which guides a motor response.
Literature on beta frequency oscillations across the cortico-basal ganglia network
suggests that different information is represented in this neural signal. With regards to the
sensorimotor beta rhythm, it is suggested that it codes estimation of time towards an action
(Arnal, 2012; Fujioka, Trainor, Large, & Ross, 2012), general movement planning (Engel &
Fries, 2010; Jenkinson & Brown, 2011) or an anticipatory up-regulation of motor processing in
face of an upcoming action (Bai et al., 2005; Kilavik et al., 2013). Furthermore, it is also
associated with inhibiting an action (Swann et al., 2011; Swann et al., 2009; Wagner, Wessel,
Ghahremani, & Aron, 2018). In addition to the sensorimotor rhythm, beta oscillations are also
widely reported from prefrontal regions while processing rewards. Both anticipation (Kawasaki
& Yamaguchi, 2013) and delivery (Cohen & Ranganath, 2007; HajiHosseini, Rodríguez-Fornells,
& Marco-Pallarés, 2012) of rewards increased beta oscillations in frontal regions during reward
learning and risky gambling tasks. More recent line of work has demonstrated that rewardrelated signals are also present in the sensorimotor rhythm (Meyniel & Pessiglione, 2014).
Presentation of larger compared to smaller prospective reward resulted in greater motivation to
exert physical force towards obtaining the reward, which was reflected as greater
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desynchronization of the beta rhythm from the sensorimotor region. These results support the
role of sensorimotor beta rhythm in translating the motivation towards a motor activation. The
results extend these findings showing how both reward magnitude and risk level shape the
pattern of sensorimotor rhythm to guide the upcoming action. My claims are strongly supported
by the data showing direct contribution of beta oscillations in predicting individual differences in
behavioral task performance as well as impulsive and risk-taking tendencies measured through
GRCS.
There were several limitations in the present studies. Fist, our sample was limited to
undergraduate college students. The current results could not be generalized to the general
population. Further studies should recruit a large sample size with a wider age range from the
community. Second, there was a great gender bias in the present samples with much more female
compared to the male participants. Previous literature suggested the gender difference in
inhibitory control (e.g., Li, Huang, Constable, & Sinha, 2006). Further studies are required to
clarify the effect of gender with more balanced sample size between males and females. Finally,
due to the poor spatial resolution of EEG, it is hard to determine the specific brain regions
actually work together during the decision making process of speeded actions. For future study,
it is important to combine multiple neural measurements such as fMRI for a better understanding
of the neural mechanism of this process.
In sum, the present studies investigated the contribution of the reward amount and
assessed risk level in decision making for speeded actions and the neural correlates of this
process. A novel experimental paradigm presenting an ecologically valid decision making
scenario, which implements both reward and risk during a Go-NoGo task was used in the present
studies. The results indicate that in general, larger rewards increases movement speed despite
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being associated with higher risk of losing and the degree to which reward influences
performance, is modulated by the assessed risk-level. This is reflected as a systematic speedaccuracy trade-off across different levels of reward and risk, which are the two determinants of
the action value. At the neural level, the beta frequency oscillations from sensorimotor cortex
and the right prefrontal region represent the reward magnitude and risk level in order to guide
decision making. Moreover, individual differences in risk taking and impulsive tendencies
contributes to this process such that individuals with greater risk taking and impulsive tendencies
does not adequately adjust their behavior across different reward levels. The results demonstrate
that when making decisions for a speeded action, the associated costs and benefits are evaluated
based on the potential reward and risk level, which are the two determinants of the action value.
In addition, these decision variables can guide choice for actions by modulating brain oscillations.
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Table 1: Performance of Speed-Rewarded Go-NoGo task in each condition
20%
Low
reward

High
reward

FA for NoGo
Z-scored RT for
Go
Speed-accuracy
trade-off
FA for NoGo

50%

80%

M

SD

M

SD

M

SD

0.056

0.097

0.112

0.124

0.294

0.304

0.465

0.520

0.290

0.424

0.026

0.512

0.783

0.504

0.951

0.500

1.806

1.86

0.052

0.071

0.149

0.156

0.316

0.289

0.073

0.234

- 0.314

0.321

1.200

0.572

2.399

1.875

Z-scored RT for
0.348
0.454
Go
Speed-accuracy
0.862
0.650
trade-off
Note. FA: false alarm rate; RT: reaction time
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Table 2: The correlations among false alarm rate, delay discounting rate and impulsive and risktaking tendencies in each probability and reward condition
BIS/BAS
BIS

BAS

Barratt Impulsiveness
Scale

GRCS

Delay Discounting
Rate (k)

FA_20

-.025

.102

-.089

.177

.218*

FA_50

-.005

-.094

-.118

.15

.117

FA_80

-.012

.013

-.025

.192*

.229*

FA_Low

.022

.011

-.097

.255**

.256**

FA_High

-.045

-.021

-.04

.143

.177

FA_Total

-.015

-.007

-.076

.219*

.241*

Note. * p < .05
** p < .01
FA_20; FA_50; FA_80: False alarm rate in 20%, 50%, 80% Go-probability conditions, FA_Low;
FA_High: False alarm rate in high and low reward conditions, FA_Total: overall false alarm rate.
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Table 3: The correlations among normalized RT, discounting rate and risk preference in each
probability and reward condition
BIS/BAS

Barratt
Impulsiveness Scale

GRCS

Delay Discounting
Rate (k)

BIS

BAS

Z-scored RT_20

-.067

.09

-.001

-.085

.125

Z-scored RT_50

-.119

.076

-.11

.061

.125

Z-scored RT_80

-.099

.126

-.029

-.093

-.077

Z-scored RT_Low

-.184

.203*

-.139

-.08

.04

Z-scored RT_High

.035

-.111

.105

.078

.125

Z-scored RT_Total

-.199*

.177

-.101

-.129

.103

Note. * p < .05
** p < .01
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Figure 1: The motor pathways. A) Indirect pathway; B) Direct pathway; C) Hyper-direct
pathway.
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Figure 2: The trial structure of Speed-Rewarded Go-NoGo task.
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Figure 3: The performance of Speed-Rewarded Go-NoGo task (study1). (A) Z-scored RT; (B)
false alarm rate; (C) the speed-accuracy trade-off.
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Figure 4: The correlations between the performance of Speed-Rewarded Go-NoGo task and the
impulsive and risk-taking tendencies. (A) The correlation between GRCS total score and false
alarm rate; (B) the correlation between delay discounting and false alarm rate; (C) the correlation
between BIS score and Z-scored RT; (D) the correlation between the GRCS total score and the
difference of false alarm rate between high and low reward conditions.
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Figure 5: Performance of Speed-Rewarded Go-NoGo task (study 2). (A) The Z-scored RT, (B)
false alarm rate, (C) Speed-accuracy trade-off.
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Figure 6: EEG beta band activity in left sensorimotor region during Trial Information and Ready
period. (A) Time-frequency map of the beta band power across all the trials. (B) The mean beta
band power in each Reward and Go-probability condition. (C) Left: the main effect of Reward
during Trial Information period; Middle: the main effect of Go-probability during Trial
Information period; Right: the main effect of Go-probability during Ready period.
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Figure 7: EEG beta band activity in right prefrontal region during Trial Information and Ready
period. (A) Time-frequency map of the beta band power across all the trials. (B) The mean beta
band power in each Reward and Go-probability condition. (C) Left: the main effect of Reward
during Trial Information period; Middle: the main effect of Go-probability during Trial
Information period; Right: the main effect of Reward during Ready period.
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Figure 8: EEG beta band activity in right prefrontal region during Go/NoGo period. (A) The
mean of the beta powerNoGo – Go during Go/NoGo period under each Reward and Goprobability condition. (B) Time-frequency map of the difference in beta powerNoGo – Go across
high and low reward conditions (High-Low). (C) The interaction between Reward and Goprobability on beta powerNoGo – Go during the GO/NoGo period.
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Figure 9: Beta oscillations can predict the performance of Speed-Rewarded Go-NoGo task and
the personal trait related with risk taking and impulsive tendencies. (A) Beta oscillation during
Ready period from right prefrontal region can predict the FA in Speed-Rewarded Go/NoGo Task.
(B) Beta oscillation during Go/NoGo Period from right prefrontal region can predict the FA in
Speed-Rewarded Go/NoGo Task. (C) Beta oscillation during Trial Information period from left
sensorimotor cortex can predict the Gambling Expectation score. (D) Beta oscillation during
Ready period from right prefrontal region can predict the Gambling Expectation score.
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